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MORAL CHARACTER, MOTIVE, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BLAME
97 Cornell Law Review ___ (forthcoming, 2012)
Janice Nadler
Mary-Hunter Morris McDonnell
Blameworthiness, in the criminal law context, is conceived as the carefully calculated end
product of discrete judgments about a transgressor’s intentionality, causal proximity to
harm, and the harm’s foreseeability. Research in social psychology, on the other hand,
suggests that blaming is often intuitive and automatic, driven by a natural impulsive desire to
express and defend social values and expectations. The motivational processes that underlie
psychological blame suggest that judgments of legal blame are influenced by factors the law
does not always explicitly recognize or encourage. In this Article we focus on two highly
related motivational processes – the desire to blame bad people and the desire to blame
people whose motive for acting was bad. We report three original experiments that suggest
that an actor’s bad motive and bad moral character can increase not only perceived blame
and responsibility, but also perceived causal influence and intentionality. We show that
people are motivated to think of an action as blameworthy, causal, and intentional when they
are confronted with a person who they think has a bad character, even when the character
information is totally unrelated to the action under scrutiny. We discuss implications for
doctrines of mens rea definitions, felony murder, inchoate crimes, rules of evidence, and
proximate cause.

INTRODUCTION
It is a fundamental tenet of criminal law that we do not judge the criminality of an act
based on the character of the actor. Rather, “[t]he sun of justice shines alike for the evil and
the good… [T]he most vicious [defendant] is presumed innocent until proven guilty.” 1 The
purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether a person committed a criminal act, as
opposed to whether the person is good or bad in the abstract. The prosecutor’s task is simply
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1
People v. White, 24 Wend. 520, 574 (N.Y. 1840) (opinion of Justice Verplanck) (quoted in JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 1, 126 (1984)).
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to prove that the defendant’s actions meet the statutory elements of a crime, and offense
elements do not require proof of character. Blameworthiness, in this context, is conceived as
the carefully calculated end product of discrete judgments about a transgressor’s
intentionality, causal proximity to harm, and the harm’s foreseeability. The logic of criminal
liability takes into account the particular harmful act, done with a particular mental state,
causing a particular harmful result, and the combination of those elements determine the
blame assigned to the offender; there is no room in this calculation for varying blame
according to the actor’s moral character.2
Research in social psychology, on the other hand, suggests that blaming is often
intuitive and automatic, driven by a natural impulsive desire to express and defend social
values and expectations. 3 Blaming serves an integral social function.4 By blaming a
wrongdoer, we establish, enforce, and express the social boundaries and rules of our
community.5 To this end, people are often willing to make sacrifices to punish cheaters, even
when they themselves are not the ones who have been cheated.6 Blaming in ordinary social
life primarily serves as an expressive social tool to sort the ‘bad’ members of society from
the ‘good’ members of society and, thereby, to foster solidarity and cohesion among those
who are appropriately abiding social expectations.7 In ordinary social life, an actor’s
perceived character and reasons for acting, therefore, are of primary importance to the
process of administering blame for a harmful action.8
In this Article, we suggest that the legal and social psychological processes of blame
cannot be completely divorced. Inevitably, formal legal processes of blame are informed and
influenced by social psychological processes of blame, which often operate on a level
beneath conscious awareness. Specifically, we suggest that perceptions of an actor’s moral
character and motive for acting together affect our intuitions of blame, responsibility, and
ultimately criminal liability for their harmful act. We have a natural, psychological
inclination to punish people with bad characters and who act with bad motives; that
inclination shapes the way that we interpret information in a formal legal proceeding in a
process that we refer to as “motivated inculpation.” In a series of original social
psychological experiments, we provide evidence that when people judge a harmful action
But see Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423 (1995) (arguing that Aristotelian
virtue forms the basis for blame and punishment).
3
See Emile Durkheim, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., The Free Press
1984)(suggesting that processes of blaming and punishing allow members of a society to express indignation at
acts that offend the collective conscience, thereby affirming collective values and fostering social cohesion);
Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as
Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002).
4
See J.L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1982); MICHAEL MOORE,
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (Clarendon Press, 1997); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter,
Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137 (2002); Paul H. Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D.
Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633 (2007).
5
See Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 31 (Joseph Sanders
& V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001); Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 SCI. 998 (2007).
6
See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third Party Third Party Punishment and Social Norms, 25 EVOLUTION
AND HUM. BEHAVIOR 63 (2004).
7
Durkheim, supra note 3, at 64 (“Punishment is, above all, intended to have its affect on honest people.”).
8
See, e.g., Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1982)
(arguing that blame and punishment are not meted for acts at all, but for the character traits indicated by those
acts); Richard Brandt, ETHICAL THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICS 465-75 (1959)
(suggesting that blameworthy actions are those that would not occur absent a bad moral character).
2
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performed by bad person or performed with a bad motive, they perceive that person as more
responsible, and the act as more causal and intentional, than when they judge an identical
harmful action conducted by a ‘good’ person. Thus, it is possible that intuitive and automatic
psychological blaming motivations can permeate more formal legal mechanisms of blame.
Ultimately, this suggests that the social-psychological impulse to punish bad people who act
with bad motives can color the legal process of blame, such that we are more likely to
interpret the harmful action of a bad person as comporting with the statutory components of a
crime and, in turn, as worthy of criminal condemnation and punishment.
This Article advances research and theory in bringing to light ways in which legal
blame is driven by psychological blaming processes. Our analysis informs essential
normative questions regarding the extent to which legal processes ought to take into account
the psychological factors that drive the mechanisms of blame. For example, to what extent
and under what circumstances should a defendant’s motive for acting be admitted into
evidence and considered in liability judgments? Can the rules of evidence effectively exclude
information about moral character, and is exclusion of this evidence a proper goal, given how
such information is likely used by jurors and judges? These normative lie at the heart of
criminal adjudication; yet, they are outside the scope of this Article. These key normative
questions can be dealt with only after we gain a deeper understanding of empirical questions
about psychological blaming processes. This Article furthers our understanding of the
empirical issues and provides the groundwork for normative analyses of the proper role of
motive and character in criminal liability.
In proceeding, we will first discuss differences between legal and psychological
mechanisms of blame, focusing on the role that character information is understood to play
within each paradigm. The law governing criminal trials generally attempts to purge
character from its blaming processes in several ways. Criminal law itself, especially in its
contemporary form, breaks the blaming process into discrete, component parts -- such as act,
mental state, attendant circumstances, and result, leaving little room for judgments about the
defendant’s moral character. Moreover, evidence law places strict limits on the admissibility
of character evidence. By contrast, psychological blaming processes are strongly influenced
by preexisting motivational factors that prompt us, as decision makers, to assign importance
to factors (like perceived character) that are legally incidental or even irrelevant. In Part I of
this Article, we explore the criminal law’s treatment of moral character and motive in
liability, which we later contrast with psychological blaming processes. In doing so, we draw
on Durkheimian punishment theory and the psychological phenomenon of motivated
reasoning to craft our own account of how information about a transgressor’s character
influences perceivers’ determinations of blame and responsibility. In Part II, we present a test
of our theory in a series of three social psychological experiments in which we find that
perceived bad moral character or bad motive can trigger an impulse to view an actor’s
harmful conduct as more causal, intentional and blameworthy. These experimental results
show that basic judgments of blame, responsibility, causation, and intentionality can be
molded by motivational forces just as readily as everyday perceptions about, say, the
adorableness of our own children or the negligible health implications of that delicious
looking piece of cake on the table. In Part III we analyze some practical applications of our
findings for several legal doctrines where evidence of bad moral character and motive may
come into play, such as in determinations of proximate cause, application of the felony
murder doctrine, and evidentiary treatment of character evidence. Finally, Part IV concludes
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with a discussion of limitations of the current experiments, as well as directions for further
empirical investigation.
I. MORAL CHARACTER AND MOTIVE
A. Motive and Character in Legal and Social Psychological Processes of Blame
In general, our legal system eschews the role of character in criminal liability
determinations, relying instead on an act-based system of inculpation.9 According to this
view, the state’s right to impose blame on an actor derives solely from the actor’s
commission of a prohibited act. 10 Put simply, we blame a criminal for what she did, not who
she is.
That being said, as human beings we are nevertheless naturally motivated to punish
people who we see as having a bad moral character or a lasting criminal disposition. As John
Henry Wigmore has asserted, “The deep tendency of human nature to punish, not because
our defendant is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned
now that he is caught, is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of
court.”11 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has warned that evidence of prior
criminal activity to display a “propensity” to commit a crime poses a “risk that a jury will
convict for crimes other than those charged – or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict
anyway because a bad person deserves punishment.”12
In an article providing empirical confirmation of this tendency, Theodore Eisenberg
and Valerie Hans analyzed a sample of real jury cases and found that, where the evidence is
weak or ambiguous, a jury that learns of a defendant’s prior criminal record is significantly
more likely to convict than a jury without such knowledge.13 Earlier experimental research
also demonstrated the influence of prior crime on likelihood of judgment of guilt. The
experimental research suggests that the seriousness and similarity of prior crimes plays an
important role, such that serious crimes or those similar to the crime on trial are more likely
to lead to guilt judgments than trivial or dissimilar crimes.14 In fact, some experiments find
9

On the other hand, character does play an accepted role in processes of punishment. For a thoughtful
discussion of the distinction between the role of character in phases of guilt vs. phases of punishment, see
Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 99, 99 (1996).
10
See, e.g., id. (“Although a defendant’s character sometimes can function as evidence of whether the defendant
committed the alleged act with a culpable mental state, the defendant’s character is not itself a criterion or an
element of guilt.”); see also G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 60 (Allen W. Wood
trans., Cambridge University Press 1991)(1821)(suggesting that the commission of an act that infringes on a
member of society is necessary and sufficient to justify the state’s imposition of criminal sanction).
11
See WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 127.
12
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st
Cir. 1982)). See also Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 165, 197 (2006).
13
Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal
Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1357, 1380–85 (2009).
14
See Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant's Previous Criminal Record:
A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 734, 753-55; Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy
of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 37, 47 (1985); Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the
Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 237-38 (1976).
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no increased likelihood of guilt judgments when the prior crime is dissimilar to the current
crime.15 The influence of prior similar crimes on guilt judgments seems to suggest that
people make a simple inference about propensity that operates within a given category. For
example, people might reason along the lines of, “Once a burglar, always a burglar.”16 But
the delimitations of the categories employed in this regard remain unsettled in the literature;
the relevant category might be as narrow as a particular offense, such as burglary, or as broad
as a class of offenses, such as violent crimes. Regardless, the empirical literature provides
fairly robust proof that evidence of defendants’ prior crimes or character flaws can
potentially influence judgments regarding proof that the defendant committed the specific
instance of crime in question.
To protect against undue weight that jurors might place on prior crimes, Congress,
state legislatures, and courts have put into place certain evidentiary safeguards that limit
admission of evidence regarding moral character and prior crimes. For example, the Federal
Rules of Evidence generally prohibit the admission of evidence to establish that a person has
a bad character under Rule 404(a).17 This rule bars the prosecution from presenting evidence
that suggests a defendant’s general immoral disposition as a strategy to demonstrate the
likelihood that the defendant committed a specific crime. Additionally, evidence of a
defendant’s “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” is disallowed if it is being used “to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith” under Rule 404(b).18
Despite the system’s best efforts to prevent character-based inferences from affecting
judgments of criminal liability, some character information will still leak into a trial as
inextricably tangled up with other accepted elements of culpability, such as actus reus and
mens rea, and various defenses such as duress.19 In fact, Rule 404(b)’s bar against evidence
of other crimes does not apply when the evidence is introduced to demonstrate “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.”20 For example, in Smith’s trial for unlawful gun possession, evidence that police
also found cocaine and a large amount of cash in his car might be admissible show Smith’s
motive for possessing the gun, i.e., to protect himself. Thus, although other crimes or bad
acts are not admissible to prove the defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit the
See E. Gil Clary & David R. Shaffer, Another Look at the Impact of Juror Sentiments Toward Defendants on
Juridic Decisions, 125 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 637 (1985). Howe (1991) suggests that it is similarity and not
seriousness that does the work. Edmund S. Howe, Judged Likelihood of Different Second Crimes: A Function of
Judged Similarity, 21 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 697 (1991). But the design of the experiment reporting this
finding employed a within-subjects design that posed a very large series of simple propensity questions. It is
therefore likely that the findings of this study are properly limited to what people say ought to matter, and not
how they actually make judgments. Other studies suggest that there are two separate effects, one for similarity
and one for seriousness. See Wissler & Saks, supra note 14.
16
See Hans & Doob, supra note 14.
17
FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (allowing such evidence only when it is used in specific rebuttal to evidence of good
character submitted by the defense).
18
FED. R. EVID. 404(b). But see FED. R. EVID. 413 (permitting admission of propensity evidence in sexual
assault cases).
19
However, Holmes suggests that the criminal law can more capably enforce standards of behavior to the extent
that we separate liability from inferences of character derived from motive. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 50 (1881) (“[W]hen we are dealing with that part of the law which aims more directly than any
other at establishing standards of conduct… we should expect there more than elsewhere to find that the tests of
liability are external, and independent of the degree of evil in the particular person’s motives or intentions.”).
20
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
15
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crime in question,21 sometimes bad acts or crimes can be introduced to prove that the
defendant had a special reason to commit the crime in question. In this sense, motive is
sometimes relevant in proving criminal liability, for purposes other than showing that the
defendant’s bad character suggests that he acted badly in the instant case.
Motive comes in many guises here, because motive might influence decisions about
blame for a variety of different reasons. Motive is most explicitly recognized as relevant in
hate crimes, in which the defendant harms a victim because of a protected characteristic of
that victim, such as disability, gender, race, etc.22 Hate crime statutes are unusual in the sense
that motive is an element of the offense, and so must be proven in order for liability to attach.
In other cases, motive might be admitted into evidence, but is not required as an element of
the offense. In the example of Smith discussed earlier, motive for possessing the gun tends to
prove that he did in fact possess the gun. The fact that Smith had a good reason for carrying
the gun (to protect against theft of his cash and drugs) makes less plausible his claim, for
example, that the gun was not his, or that he was not aware that it was in the car. Another
example of permissible (but not required) use of motive is to distinguish among possible
mental states. For example, in a murder trial, evidence that Jones was having an affair with
the victim’s wife might be admissible to show that Jones killed the victim intentionally,
rather than recklessly. Motive might also serve as the basis for non-liability. Examples of
situations in which motive might lead to a defense against liability include killing in order to
avoid being killed (i.e., self-defense justification), or driving through a red light to rush a
dying person to a hospital (i.e., necessity justification).23
In this way, the law sometimes permits consideration of a defendant’s motive, while
it simultaneously disavows allowing the defendant’s moral character to influence judgments
of blame. But, as our examples illustrate, motive and character are not always readily
distinguishable. The information about Jones’ affair may be admissible for its relevance to
his motive and mens rea, but this information also readily lends itself to unflattering
inferences about Jones’ character as the kind of person who would have an affair with his
business partner’s wife. Thus, the line between specific motive and general moral character is
not always clear.24
The difficulty of distinguishing between motive and character also sometimes arises
when harm was caused unintentionally. The Model Penal Code incorporates a definition of
recklessness that takes into account the “nature and purpose” of the defendant’s conduct, for
purposes of determining whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a “gross deviation from

But see FED. R. EVID. 413 (permitting admission of propensity evidence in sexual assault cases).
See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 422.55 (a) “Hate crime” means a criminal act committed, in whole or in part,
because of one or more of the following actual or perceived characteristics of the victim: (1) Disability. (2)
Gender. (3) Nationality. (4) Race or ethnicity. (5) Religion. (6) Sexual orientation. (7) Association with a person
or group with one or more of these actual or perceived characteristics.
23
In addition to the issue of the role of motive in liability judgments, there is a separate question about the role
of motive in sentencing. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
89, 90 n.1 2006-2007 (defendant’s motive is traditionally an important factor in criminal sentencing).
24
The extent to which motive ought to influence liability and blame has been a topic of some debate. See, e.g.,
Elaine M. Chiu, The Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 653, 673 (2004-2005)
(motive ought to be part of criminal law to track ordinary perceptions of blame); Martin R. Gardner, The Mens
Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635
(evil motive is a theoretical basis for defenses like insanity or duress, but not for offense definitions); Hessick,
id.(motive should play an expanded role in criminal punishment).
21
22
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the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”25
Recklessness in the Model Penal Code also involves the disregard of an “unjustifiable risk.”26
The justifiability of the risk is determined by “considering the nature and purpose of the
actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him.”27 The same phrase is included in the
MPC definition of negligence.28 The nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct are, in many
situations, inextricably intertwined with the actor’s motive for acting. The defendant who
shoots a gun into a crowd for fun is reckless because the nature and purpose of his conduct is
unjustifiable, and so the risk he creates is unjustifiable as well. The defendant who shoots to
try to stop a purse snatcher, on the other hand, has a stronger argument that the risk he took
was justified. In this way, the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct can be placeholders
for motive, and motive can be a strong signal of moral character.
Motive, in the sense of nature and purpose of conduct that leads to unintended harm,
does influence blame judgments as an empirical matter. Consider Mark Alicke’s series of
experiments, which suggest that we are more likely to assign blame when a transgressor had
a bad motive for doing an act that resulted in harm. 29 In one study, participants read about a
man who was speeding home in the rain and negligently collided with another car, causing
injury.30 Some people were told that the man was speeding home because he wanted to hide a
vial of cocaine from his parents, whereas others were told that he was speeding home to hide
an anniversary present for his parents. Judgments of blame varied systematically with the
reason for why the driver was speeding: people who learned that he was speeding home to
hide cocaine blamed him more than those who learned he was speeding home to hide the
present.31 Thus, the driver’s motivation for speeding influenced lay judgments of blame.
Alicke argues that we are inclined to blame transgressors with bad motives for acting because
it leads to an inference that they had more control over the situation that led to the harm.32
But Alicke’s experimentally proffered reasons for acting come with obvious concomitant
inferences as to the actor’s underlying character: whereas we would generally make
favorable inferences about the character of the kind of person who is motivated to plan the
perfect surprise to honor their parents’ anniversary, we would be prone to make quite
opposite inferences about the character of a paranoia-panicked cocaine possessor.
It is easy to see that admissible information about a defendant’s motive could, in
some instances, implicitly encourage inferences about the defendant’s moral character. These
inferences are consonant with a theoretical literature on punishment and character that argues
that inferences about moral character ought to be an integral component of legal blaming
processes. On this view, responsibility for an action derives from the actor’s responsibility
for his or her own character.33 Theorists within this tradition contend that a defendant only
25

MPC 2.02(2)(c).
MPC 2.02(2)(c).
27
Id.
28
MPC 2.02(2)(d).
29
See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368 (1992).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCH. BULL. 556 (2000). It is also
possible to engage in motivated non-blaming. For example, only 15% of people in Arab countries believed that
the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Arabs. See Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to
Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (2003).
33
See Michael Moore, supra note 4, at 563 (describing but not endorsing this view).
26
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ought to be culpable for a harmful action insofar as we can infer from the action that the
defendant has a flawed character or a blameworthy disposition: if the action “reveals what
sort of person he is in some respect.”34 According to this perspective, acts are only
blameworthy to the extent that they betray an underlying character flaw in the actor.35
Excuses, in this framework, operate to thwart the inference from action to character, thus
blocking the attachment of blame.36 Claims of duress, necessity, or accident each derive from
situations in which someone of good character could nevertheless find themselves engaging
in a harmful or socially undesirable action.37
Several contemporary theorists oppose the idea that blame derives from character,
arguing that blame and punishment ought to be divorced from inferences about character.38
In this Article, we theorize that character information that is wholly unrelated to the harmful
action at issue can color the way in which factfinders’ interpret that action. Thus, our claim in
this Article is consistent with -- but broader than -- Alicke’s culpable control theory. We
hypothesize that people are more inclined to blame (and inclined to blame more harshly) not
only when the actor’s reasons for acting are bad, but, more generally, when they have any
reason to believe that the actor is a bad person. We hypothesize that, as an empirical matter,
a bad motive for acting is not necessary for perceivers to make character-based inferences
with respect to blame and responsibility. Rather, any unfavorable character inferences will
suffice to motivate the inculpation of a transgressor.
B. Motivated Inculpation
Earlier, we raised a core concern expressed by many judges and legal scholars over
the years: namely, that knowledge of a previous conviction biases the case against the
defendant.39 The intuitions of Wigmore and of the Supreme Court justices regarding
character and blame are examples of a broader phenomenon that social psychologists call
JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 126 (1970); see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW 801 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978) (“The question [of a just conclusion of culpability]
becomes whether a particular wrongful act is attributable either to the actor’s character or to the circumstances
which overwhelmed his capacity for choice…”);
35
See, e.g., Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1 L. & PHIL. 5, 7-15 (1982)
(arguing that actions may or may not demonstrate underlying character traits, but that blame is only appropriate
when a socially undesirable trait can be inferred); George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96
YALE L.J. 1661, 1673-74 (1987) (“Whether an actor merits praise or blame… will depend on how it reflects on
the agent, or on something enduring in the agent (which, following tradition, we are calling his ‘character.’”);
NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 68 (1988) (arguing that
“it is unfair to hold people responsible for actions which are out of character, but only fair to hold them so
for actions in which their settled dispositions are centrally expressed”); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL
THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICS 465-74 (1959).
36
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 383 (1981). (“Excuses show an act is not to be attributed to
a defect in character...”).
37
Sendor points out that there is some corroboration of this conception of evidence in the commentaries to the
Model Penal Code. Sendor, supra note 10, at n.7. For example, the MPC suggests that “one who kills in
response to certain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating a significantly different character
deficiency than one who kills in their absence.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §210.3, at 55 (1985).
38
See Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of
Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1027 (2004)(arguing that conclusions
about immoral character creates a permanent criminal caste)
39
See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
34
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“motivated reasoning.” The general principle is that sometimes we have a preferred
conclusion and we are motivated to assume the veracity of that conclusion, construing any
evidence presented to us in a way that allows us to confirm our initial preference. For
example, in a study on perceptions of risk, women who read an article claiming that caffeine
posed a risk to women’s health were less convinced by the evidence if they themselves were
heavy caffeine users; no such difference was found for men.40 The women who were heavy
caffeine users had a stake in the results. They initially preferred a conclusion that allowed
them to go on enjoying their coffee breaks, so they were motivated to discount the evidence.
However, women who were light caffeine users, as well as men, had less reason to discount
the evidence, so they generally did not.
There are many ways in which serving our own interests can drive the conclusions we
endorse.41 But having a personal stake in the results is just one source of motivation among
many. We are also motivated to construe information before us in ways that confirm other
previously-held biases or preconceived notions. For example, one recent study provides
evidence that judges may misremember the facts of the case before them in ways that support
subconsciously endorsed racial stereotypes.42 And jurors sometimes engage in motivated
evaluation of evidence by disregarding and failing to discuss evidence that supports the
conclusion opposite to the one they already favor.43
A prime example of motivated reasoning in law lies in policy-biased judging. Judges
profess to decide cases neutrally; some even profess that their role is like an umpire calling
balls and strikes.44 Very few judges would acknowledge that they decide cases according to
their own policy preferences. Yet there is a wealth of evidence from real cases demonstrating
that judges decide cases according to their personal political ideology.45 In the laboratory,

See Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 636 (1987).
41
See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff & Colin Camerer, Biased Judgments of
Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV.1337 (1995); Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel
Issacharoff, Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 L. & SOC. INQ. 401 (1997); Linda Babcock
& George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 109 (1997).
42
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1195 (2009).
43
Kurt A. Carlson & J. Edward Russo, Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock Jurors, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCH.: APP. 91 (2001).
44
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/politics/politicsspecial/12cnd-text-roberts.html
45
See Glendon A. Schubert, THE JUDICIAL MIND (Northwestern Univ. Press, 1965); Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting
Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 86 AMER. POLI. SCI. REV. 32 (1984)
(finding that, in search and seizure cases, political ideology predicts outcome); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J.
Spaeth, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993) (judges’ prior
ideological preferences strongly influence case outcomes); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of
Supreme Court Decision-Making, 86 AMER. POLI. SCI. REV. 323 (1992);
Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Norms, Dragons, and Stare Decisis: A Response, 40 AMER. J. POLI. SCI.
1064 (1996) (judges engage in a biased decision process in which they find precedent consistent with their
ideology more convincing than precedent that is contrary to their ideology); Eileen Braman, LAW, POLITICS, &
PERCEPTION : HOW POLICY PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING (University of Virginia Press, 2009);
Eileen Braman, Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability of Preferences in Legal Decision
Making,68 J. POLI. 308 (2006) (decisions about standing in a free speech case about abortion are influenced
both by free speech attitudes and abortion attitudes); Richard E. Redding & N. Dicon Reppucci, Effects of
Lawyers’ Socio-Political Attitudes on their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making, 23 L. &
40
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people predisposed to favor a policy permitting gay scout leaders judged other cases to be
more similar if they involved a finding of illegal discrimination.46 In another study, law
students deciding the constitutionality of a proposed change in a school district’s tax rate
were more likely to find unconstitutionality when the proposed tax rate was inconsistent with
their own tax policy preferences.47 This finding emerged even though the participants were
provided with a monetary incentive to arrive at the legally correct decision. Of course, judges
(and everyone else) who engages in motivated reasoning are generally unaware that they are
doing so.48 For example, judges who understand that they must disregard information that is
excluded from evidence, and genuinely attempt to ignore it, remain on the whole unable to
refrain from being influenced by the barred information.49
When we make a decision, we often have several goals, even if we’re not consciously
aware of them. First, people generally want to reach the conclusion that is best supported by
the available evidence. At the same time, other goals bias how we interpret and process this
evidence, before we reach the conclusion. Sometimes we have initial intuitions or hypotheses
that are driven by our pre-existing preferences.50 We then tend to reject some evidence and
accept other evidence in a biased fashion, consistent with our preferences.51 We evaluate
evidence according to what we already believe.52 We selectively remember some things but
not others.53 We are influenced by factors that we ourselves regard as unjustifiable, though
we often aren’t aware of such influence.54 This is especially true when the legitimate
evidence is elastic – when there is more wiggle room to come out either way in the
conclusion.55 And, when we finally allow ourselves to reach the conclusion we preferred
from the beginning, we convince ourselves that we chose it because of the evidence, not
because of any other goals we have.56 In sum, as Professors Hanson and Yosifon instruct,
HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1999) (personal support for death penalty influences decisions about whether particular social
science evidence is admissible under Daubert).
46
See Eileen Braman & Thomas E. Nelson, Mechanisms of Motivated Reasoning? Analogical Perception in
Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 940 (1997).
47
See Joshua R. Furguson, Linda Babcock & Peter M. Shane, Do a Law’s Policy Implications Affect Beliefs
about its Constitutionality? An Experimental Test, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 219 (2008) (The correct decision was
determined by a law professor and a federal judge who independently arrived at the same ruling).
48
See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, The Halo Effect: Evidence for Unconscious Alteration of
Judgments, 35 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 250 (1977).
49
See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV.1251 (2005).
50
See Kunda, supra note 40.
51
See Peter H. Ditto, James A. Scepansky & Geoffrey D. Munro, Motivated Sensitivity to PreferenceInconsistent Information, 75 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 53 (1998).
52
See Babcock et al., 1995, supra note 41; Dan Simon, Lien B. Pham, Quang A. Le, & Keith J. Holyoak, The
Emergence of Coherence over the Course of Decision Making, 27 J. EXP. PSYCH: LEARNING, MEMORY &
COGNITION 1250 (2001).
53
William M. Klein & Ziva Kunda, Maintaining Self-Serving Social Comparisons: Biased Reconstruction of
One’s Past Behaviors, 19 PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 732 (1993).
54
Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors Influence Judgments, 66 ORG. BEHAV.
& HUM. DEC. PROC. 122 (1996).
55
Id.
56
See Ziva Kunda, The Case for motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 498 (1990); Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff
Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motivational Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased
Hypothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES IN EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 297 (1987).
56
See Babcock et al., 1995, supra note 41; Simon, et al. supra note 52.
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“The first lesson of motivated reasoning, whatever its manifestation, is that we humans tend
to hold beliefs and reach judgments and conclusions that we desire, and we vastly
underappreciate that tendency – particularly in ourselves.”57
We are especially prone to engage in motivated reasoning when we hold strong
opinions on a complex issue. Under these circumstances, we examine relevant evidence in a
biased manner, accepting favorable evidence at face value, while critically evaluating and
discounting unfavorable evidence.58 Sometimes we hold strong opinions about judgments
involving justice – for example, we read about a heinous crime in the newspaper and feel
strongly that the criminal ought to be harshly punished. In our own day-to-day lives, beliefs
about justice and motivations to seek just outcomes can influence what we remember. We
may adjust memories of past events to maintain a belief that people get what they deserve.59
For example, people asked to recall the value of a lottery prize remember a smaller amount
awarded when the winner was a bad person, compared to a good person.60 Indeed, biased
recall can extend to memories about ourselves as well as others. In one study, people who
received a lucky break (a prize awarded by random numbers) were able to later recall more
good deeds from their own past than those who had not been lucky.61 Analogously, when we
are prompted to think of ourselves as a bad person, then we tend to think that we had it
coming if fate then deals us a bad hand. For example, people who were asked to recall bad
deeds from their past were more accepting of their fate later when they were forced to spend
25 minutes on a mind numbing task, compared to people who recalled bad deeds of other
people.62 These studies suggest that we naturally inflate or devalue our conception of our
own selves to see our fate as just and fair.
So how does the phenomenon of motivated reasoning relate to judgments of criminal
liability? We contend that people harbor a generalized social preference to inculpate people
with bad characters.63 In understanding this initial preference, it is useful to consider
Durkheim’s account of the social function of crime and punishment. Attaching blame for a
crime, according to Durkheim, performs a necessary expressive social function, allowing
members of society to affirm and protect collective values. In punishing, says Durkheim, “we
are avenging… the outrage to morality.”64 And by blaming and punishing, according to
Durkheim, we are effectively differentiating ourselves from members of the society who are
Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism,
Power Economics and Deep Capture, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 129, 138 (2003).
58
Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 2098 (1979).
59
See also Babcock, Loewenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 41.
60
Mitchell J. Callan, Aaron C. Kay, Nicolas Davidenko & John H. Ellard, The Effects of Justice Motivation on
Memory for Self- and Other-Relevant Events, 45 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 614 (2009).
61
Id. Conversely, those who had not received the lucky break were able to recall more bad deeds from their past
than those who had received the lucky break.
62
Id. (Experiment 4).
63
A related claim is that, in assessing blameworthiness, we tend to infer personality traits from behavior. Thus,
we reason, if Smith injured Jones, it must be because Smith is a bad person. At the same time, we tend to ignore
or give insufficient weight to situational pressures that might have led Smith to injure Jones. Donald Dripps
calls this the “Fundamental Retribution Error.” See Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error:
Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383 (2003). Our focus in this Article
is different: we examine the influence of information about character that is apart from the act itself, including
reasons for acting (Experiments 1 and 2), or even information about character that is independent of the act
(Experiment 3).
64
Durkheim, supra note 3, at 47.
57
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not appropriately conforming to societal expectations, symbolically separating the ‘bad’
members of society from the ‘good’ members of society.65 Inculpation of the wicked thus
serves simultaneously as an expression of the solidarity of honest men and a reaffirmation of
the values and expectations of the collectivity.
Durkheim’s theory of punishment as a social tool ultimately suggests that we are
naturally driven to inculpate and punish a person who we believe is not properly embracing
and conforming to our collective moral code. Pairing this innate initial desire with the
literature on motivated reasoning, when we are confronted with the complex task to assign
blame for an allegedly criminal action within a formal, legal proceeding, we should be
motivated to construe the information before us in a way that best allows us to reach our
desired conclusion and punish a bad person. This leads to the hypothesis at the heart of the
phenomenon that we call motivated inculpation: if a person has any reason to infer that a
defendant has a bad moral character, that person will be more likely to construe the
defendant’s action as criminally culpable. Moreover, although formal legal proceedings try to
dissuade character-based judgments by having factfinders focus on discrete elements of the
act at issue when assigning blame, the research on motivated reasoning suggests that peoples’
initial preference to blame bad actors would likely color the way in which they interpret all
elements of the crime. Thus, we hypothesize that when a factfinder judges a harmful action
to be performed by ‘bad’ defendant or performed with a bad motive, the defendant is
perceived as more responsible, and the act as more causal and intentional, than when a
factfinder judges an identical harmful action conducted by a ‘good’ defendant.
II. EXPERIMENTS: MORAL CHARACTER AND BLAME
In the experiments we conducted for this Article, we tested the idea that judgments
about the underlying elements of criminal liability can be colored by initial inferences about
the defendant’s moral character, derived from information about the defendant’s motive for
acting or on character information that is wholly unrelated to the harmful act at issue. Thus,
we explore the notion that, just as judges may decide some cases according to their own
policy preferences, ordinary people can be motivated to blame a transgressor on the basis of
perceived moral character. In the experiments presented here, we focus on situations in
which the causal contribution of a transgressor’s act is tenuous, and mens rea is weak or
absent. By minimizing intentionality and causal connection, we are better able to observe the
role of perceived moral character in blame attributions. We hypothesize that the perceived
moral character of a transgressor will influence judgments of not only blame and
responsibility, but also of mens rea and causality.66 That is, when observers size someone up
as a bad person, they will not only be more likely to blame that bad person for any harm, but
they are also more likely to judge the act as more causal and the mental state as more
culpable. Below, we summarize the results of three experiments we conducted to test the role
of information regarding moral character in blame attributions for criminal offenses. Then we
briefly discuss some of the implications of our findings for criminal law doctrines of felony
murder, inchoate offense, causation, and the evidentiary admissibility of character evidence.

Id. at 64.
Alicke, supra note 29, found that that the driver rushing home to hide the crack vial was perceived as playing
a greater causal role in the accident than the driver rushing home to hide the anniversary present.

65
66
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A. Experiment 1: Frank Brady and the Firefighters
We conducted this preliminary experiment to test the hypothesis that bad moral character
influences perceptions of blame, responsibility, causation, and the like, for a bad outcome,
holding constant mens rea and actus reus. We recruited a group of adults to answer an online
questionnaire in which we presented a brief vignette loosely based on the case of California
v. Brady.67 In that case, the defendant was found criminally liable for the death of two
firefighters after a trailer, which he used as a methamphetamine lab, exploded. In the
vignette, we varied the contents of the trailer (methamphetamines or highly flammable
fertilizer), to examine the effect of the defendants’ character on subsequent judgments of
blame and responsibility.
1. Participants
We recruited 205 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web service,
which allows assignment of simple tasks to a large population of users online. We paid
participants 50 cents for completing the survey, which took about 5 minutes. Participants
were assured that their responses would remain anonymous and that identifying information
would not be collected. Seventeen participants were excluded because of missing data. Of the
remaining, 63% were female, with a mean age of about 37 years. Seventy-nine percent
identified themselves as White, 6% as Black, 5% as Hispanic, 5% as Asian Pacific, 2% as
South Asian, and 3% as Other. Fifteen percent were full-time students, and 8% were parttime students. Seventy percent were college educated. Ninety-five percent had lived in the
U.S. for at least 12 years. For 56% of the sample, their household income was less than
$50,000 per year. Politically, 48% identified themselves as liberal or very liberal; 28%
identified as moderate, and 25% identified as conservative or very conservative.
2. Design and materials
We randomly divided participants into two groups. One group read the “orchids”
version, and one group read the “meth” version of the vignette reproduced below:
Frank Brady lost control of a campfire that he had built on his property and it spread to a trailer he
kept on the premises. He used the trailer
[Orchids:] to store highly flammable fertilizers to care for his collection of exotic plants in his
orchid greenhouse.
[Meth:] as a methamphetamine laboratory where he used highly flammable chemicals to make
illegal drugs.
When the fire made contact with the [chemicals]/[fertilizers] in the trailer, it caused a huge
explosion and raged out of control. Four firefighter pilots in helicopters and air tankers were called
in to try and put the fire out by dousing it from overhead. During the sixth trip up to douse the fire,
one of the pilots approached from the wrong direction and collided with another helicopter. Two
pilots were killed in the collision.

Each participant read either the Orchids or the Meth version of the vignette, but not
both. After reading the vignette, participants were asked to provide their own personal
opinion about Frank Brady and his role in the death of the two pilots: to what extent he is
67

California v. Brady, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286 (Ct. App. 2005).
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responsible; how negatively he should be judged; how much he is to blame; to what extent he
caused the deaths; how intentional were his actions; how foreseeable the deaths were from
Frank Brady’s perspective; the extent to which he was careless; and how likeable he is. All
questions were measured on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The order of
presentation of these questions was random.
Participants were then asked to think about the pilot who flew in the wrong direction.
Participants were asked their personal opinions about the pilot’s role in the collision: to what
extent he was responsible; how negatively he should be judged; how much he is to blame;
and the extent to which he caused the collision. All questions were measured on a scale
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Again, the order of presentation of these
questions was random.
3. Results68
a. Judgments of Frank Brady
Participants in the Meth condition judged Frank Brady to be more responsible,69
blameworthy,70 and worthy of negative judgment71 for the death of the two pilots, compared
to participants in the Orchids condition, as illustrated in Figure 1. In addition to ultimate
judgments about blame and responsibility, other, more basic perceptions varied according to
the contents of the trailer. Despite the fact that all participants learned that the fertilizer/drugs
were “highly flammable,” the participants in the Meth condition perceived Frank Brady’s
actions to be more of a cause of the pilots’ deaths than participants in the Orchids
condition,72 also illustrated in Figure 1.

68

All analyses were conducted using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) unless otherwise noted. An analysis of
variance measures for statistical differences between the means of groups whose data are categorical (as
opposed to continuous). See William L. Hays, STATISTICS 376-81(5th ed. 1994). Throughout this Article,
“significantly” refers to statistical significance, which denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis--the
possibility of no differences between the various groups--at a probability level indicated by the p-value
reported. Thus, “p” is defined as the probability of finding a difference or relationship between two groups as
large as that observed if there were, in fact, no difference or relationship between them. William L. Hays,
STATISTICS 267-82 (5th ed. 1994).
69
F(1, 185) = 66.97, p < .001, ηp2 =.266. Partial eta-squared (ηp2) is a measure of the percent of total variance in
the dependent variable accounted for by the independent variable, analogous to R2 in regression analysis.
Interpretation is as follows: .01 small; .06 medium; .14 large.
70
F(1, 186) = 68.66, p < .001, ηp2 =.270.
71
F(1, 185) = 127.43, p < .001, ηp2 =.408.
72
F(1, 186) = 55.32, p < .001, ηp2 =.229.
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Figure 1. Mean ratings of Frank Brady’s role in the death of the two pilots, by moral
character condition (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 1)
Figure 2 illustrates perceptions of Frank Brady’s mental state, indicating the
perceived controllability of the harm. When compared to participants in the Orchids
condition, participants in the Meth condition perceived Frank Brady to be acting more
intentionally73 and carelessly in losing control of the campfire.74 Participants in the Meth
condition also perceived the deaths of the pilots to be more foreseeable.75 Not surprisingly,
participants assigned to the Meth group also perceived Frank Brady as less likeable (M =
1.84) than participants assigned to the Orchids group (M=3.65).76

F(1, 186) = 25.77, p < .001, ηp2 =.122
F(1, 183) = 7.67, p < .01, ηp2 =.040
75
F(1, 184) = 5.56, p < .05, ηp2 =.029
76
F(1, 184) = 125.08, p < .01, ηp2 =.405
73
74
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Figure 2. Mean ratings of Frank Brady’s mental state in the death of the two pilots, by moral
character condition (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 1)
b. Judgments of the Pilot in Error
After rating their perceptions of Frank Brady, participants were asked to think about
the pilot who flew the wrong way. Interestingly, judgments of the pilot were the mirror
image of judgments of Frank Brady, such that in the Meth condition the pilot was judged less
harshly than in the Orchids condition.77 Mean ratings are illustrated in Figure 3.

Pilot responsible: F(1, 183) = 13.78, p < .01, ηp2 =.070; Pilot negatively judged: F(1, 186) = 23.28, p < .01,
ηp =.111; Pilot to blame: F(1, 186) = 19.06, p < .01, ηp2 =.093; Pilot the cause: F(1, 186) = 13.59, p < .01, ηp2
=.068
77

2
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Figure 3. Mean ratings of the pilot who flew the wrong way, by Frank Brady’s moral
character (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 1)
The reversed pattern in judgments of the pilot’s responsibility suggests that
participants are perceiving a sort of conservation of responsibility, in which high
responsibility for Frank Brady implies lower responsibility for the pilot in error, and vice
versa. To illustrate this, we constructed single measures of perceived responsibility for both
Frank Brady and for the pilot. Judgments regarding Frank Brady’s responsibility, negative
judgment, blame, and share of causation were highly correlated78 as were those regarding the
pilot.79 Using the mean of these scores for Frank Brady and the pilot, respectively, we
constructed a single measure of Frank Brady’s responsibility, and a single measure of pilot
responsibility. Interestingly, participants in the Meth condition seem to perceive reduced
responsibility for the pilot who flew the wrong way, compared to participants in the Orchids
condition. This is illustrated in Figure 4.

78

Cronbach’s alpha = .95. Cronbach's alpha measures the internal consistency of a set of items, and ranges
between 0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating higher consistency. See Rick H. Hoyle, et al., RESEARCH
METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS 83-84 (7th ed. 2002).
79
Cronbach’s alpha = .90.

17

DRAFT OF APRIL 11, 2011

Figure 4. Mean perceived relative responsibility for the crash of Frank and of the pilot who
flew the wrong way, by moral character condition (Experiment 1)
4. Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrated that, even holding constant the severity of the harm and
the trangressor’s mental state, judgments about the controllability of the harm and the
trangressor’s responsibility – as well as the responsibility of other parties involved – vary
extensively depending on the perceived moral character of the transgressor. In the version of
the vignette where Frank Brady stored flammable chemicals to make methamphetamine, he
was perceived as an unlikeable guy doing bad things, even though the fire started with an
innocent campfire. Compared to the story where Brady was storing “innocent” orchid
fertilizer, the consequences that followed from the actions of the “bad” Frank Brady were
attributed as more blameworthy, as well as more intentional, causal, and foreseeable.
Seemingly, a campfire accidentally started by a “bad guy” has more causal power and gives
rise to more negative attributions than a campfire accidentally started by a “regular” person.
It must be noted, however, that the differences in foreseeability ratings give rise to a
possible alternate explanation for the results. Even though both the chemicals for
manufacturing the methamphetamine and the chemical fertilizers were both given identical
descriptions of dangerousness – namely, “highly flammable” – it might be that participants
perceived the methamphetamine chemicals to be more flammable or more dangerous than the
fertilizer. Moreover, it might be that participants judged Frank Brady as more likely to
anticipate a fire occurring with chemicals for methamphetamine than with chemicals for
greenhouse fertilizer. After all, the process of methamphetamine manufacture has a general
reputation for dangerousness; greenhouse fertilizers generally do not. To rule out this
explanation, we conducted a separate experiment (Experiment 2) also involving the storage
of flammable materials, in which we hold constant the material stored.
Another question that arises about the results of this experiment is whether we
successfully varied moral character. It stands to reason that a person who is manufacturing an
illegal and dangerous drug like methamphetamine is perceived as having a worse moral
18
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character than a person who is engaged in greenhouse gardening. Indeed, the difference in
the likeability ratings in the two versions of the story we reported earlier confirms this notion.
In the next experiment, we include additional measures designed to more directly measure
the perceived moral character of the transgressor.
Finally, there is a question about whether the observed trend in attributing more
blame and controllability to a person with bad moral character also extends to attributing less
blame and controllability to a person with good (as opposed to neutral) moral character. To
address this, in the next experiment we include three versions of moral character: bad,
neutral, and good.
B. Experiment 2: Sam Norton and the youths
1. Participants
We recruited 195 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web service, which
allows assignment of simple tasks to a large population of users online. We paid participants
50 cents for completing the survey, which took less than 5 minutes. Participants were assured
that their responses would remain anonymous and that identifying information would not be
collected. Demographic characteristics were similar to the sample in Experiment 1.
2. Design and Materials
We randomly divided participants into three groups. One group read the “good
character” version, one group read the “neutral character” version, and one group read the
“bad character” version of the vignette reproduced below:
Sam Norton used his backyard shed to store oxygen tanks. He knew the tanks posed a fire hazard,
but he stored them there because
[Daughter:] his young daughter has serious respiratory disease, and he provides around the clock
care for her
[Business:] he has just started his own business providing in-home delivery of healthcare
equipment
[Cheating Coach:] he is a high school football coach and administers oxygen to his players even
though it provides an unfair advantage and is against the rules
One night, some neighborhood youths were smoking cigarettes behind Sam Norton’s shed. One of
them tossed a lit cigarette butt on the ground near the shed. Some dry leaves ignited, and soon
after, the oxygen tanks in the shed exploded. One of the youths was killed in the explosion.

Each participant read only one version of the vignette. After reading the vignette,
participants were asked to provide their own personal opinion about Sam Norton and his role
in the death of the youth. The measures were the same as those in Experiment 1, and were
presented in random order, with the following exception. To check whether we successfully
manipulated perceived moral character, we asked to what extent Sam Norton has a good
moral character (1: not at all; 7: very much), is trustworthy (1: not at all; 7: very much), and
is a bad or good person (1: bad person; 4: not sure; 7: good person). These questions about
moral character were asked last, so as not to alert participants to the hypothesis of interest
beforehand.
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We asked three questions to gauge the perceived moral character of Sam Norton.80 As
expected, the Sam Norton who cares for his sick daughter was judged to be more moral in
character,81 more trustworthy,82 and more of a good person,83 than Norton the businessman,
who in turn was judged more favorably than Norton who cheats at football.
Participants’ judgments of the extent to which Sam Norton is responsible,84
blameworthy,85 and worthy of negative judgment,86 for the death of the youth differed
significantly across moral character condition, as did his perceived causal role.87 The
differences are in the direction expected, with Norton who takes care of his daughter the least
blameworthy and causal, and the Norton who cheats at football the most blameworthy as
causal, as illustrated in Figure 5.

Responsible

Blame
Daughter

Negatively Judge
Business

Cause
Cheating

Figure 5. Mean ratings of Sam Norton’s role in the death of the youth, by moral character
condition (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 2)
As illustrated in Figure 6, Moral Character also influenced perceptions of
intentionality, with Good Character leading to perceptions of lesser intentionality, but no

80

In the questionnaire, these questions were asked last, after all of the measures reported below.
F(2, 192) = 38.60, p < .001, ηp2 =.287. Daughter (M = 4.98); Business (M = 4.23); Cheating (M = 3.11).
82
F(2, 192) = 37.98, p < .001, ηp2 =.283. Daughter (M = 4.68); Business (M = 3.78); Cheating (M = 2.81).
83
F(2, 191) = 30.05, p < .001, ηp2 =.239. Daughter (M = 4.90); Business (M = 4.17); Cheating (M = 3.52).
84
F(2, 192) = 13.12, p < .001, ηp2 =.120.
85
F(2, 191) = 18.63, p < .001, ηp2 =.163.
86
F(2, 192) = 21.47, p < .001, ηp2 =.183.
87
F(2, 191) = 12.84; p < .001, ηp2 =.119.
81
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differences between Neutral and Bad Character.88 There was no observed influence of Moral
Character on foreseeability judgments.89

Intent
Daughter

Foresee
Business

Cheating

Figure 6. Mean ratings of Sam Norton’s mental state in the death of the youth, by moral
character condition (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 2)
4. Discussion
In Experiment 2, we replicated the results of the first experiment, while providing
more reliable controls for dangerousness of the act, as well as more directly measuring
perceived moral character. As in the first experiment, we again found that a transgressor with
a bad moral character is perceived as more blameworthy. Additionally, we found that a
transgressor with a good moral character (as opposed to neutral) is less blameworthy, so that
the moral character effect extends in both negative and positive directions, compared to the
neutral midpoint. We again demonstrated that bad moral character gives rise to attributions of
controllability, as demonstrated by the effect on perceived intent. It is noteworthy that good
moral character had no observed effect on intent.
In demonstrating the role of moral character in the first two experiments, however,
we did not separate the effects of motive or reason for acting. That is to say, in the bad moral
character condition, the inference about character arose from the transgressor’s reason for
storing the flammable materials; the same was true for good moral character. When a person
disregards a substantial risk, and the nature and purpose of her conduct is not legitimate, the
law recognizes such risk taking as the basis for criminal liability.90 On the other hand, when
the disregard of a substantial risk is motivated by a laudatory purpose, the law might
F(2, 192) = 4.40, p < .05, ηp2 =.044.
F(2, 191) = 0.62, p =.54.
90
See MPC 2.02(2)(c).
88
89
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recognize the nature of the risk, as well as its disregard, as being legitimate and therefore
insufficient to form the basis of criminal liability. Thus, Experiment 2 fails to distinguish the
influence of moral character from the influence of motive or reason for disregarding a risk.
The law does not consider moral character, standing alone, to form the basis for criminal
liability; the law does, however, consider the nature and purpose of a person’s conduct when
that person disregards a risk. To begin to try to tease these apart, the next experiment
attempts to separate moral character from the nature and purpose of the conduct that led to
harm.
C. Experiment 3: Sara Davidson and the Dogs
The previous experiments varied perceived moral character through a manipulation of the
actor’s purpose for creating the hazardous condition. In Experiment 3, we sought to make the
source of moral character more remote from the hazardous condition that was created.
Additionally, we tested a second independent variable along with moral character. In this
experiment we varied the extent to which the transgressor was aware that harm was likely.
We hypothesized that offenders who were aware of and disregarded a risk of harm are
perceived as more responsible and blameworthy than offenders who are not aware of risk –
this prediction follows directly from criminal law theory. We also predicted that bad moral
character can serve as a kind of proxy for awareness of risk, so that even when there is reason
to believe a transgressor was unaware of a risk, she will be blamed as if she were aware if she
is perceived to be a generally bad person.
1. Participants
We recruited 203 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk web service,
which allows assignment of simple tasks to a large population of users online. We paid
participants $1 for completing the survey, which took about 5 minutes to complete.
Participants were assured that their responses would remain anonymous and that identifying
information would not be collected. A number of respondents failed to correctly respond to
an instructional manipulation check91 and were thus excluded, leaving a final sample size of
182 participants. Demographic characteristics were similar to the sample in Experiment 1.
2.

Design and Materials

We randomly divided participants into four groups. We independently varied two
factors. The first was moral character (Bad; Good); the second was mental state (Aware;
Unaware). Each participant read one version of the vignette reproduced below:
[Good Character] Sara Davidson is a 39 year old woman who lives in a house with her two dogs.
Sara has two young nieces whom she adores and sees often. She spoils them with birthday

See Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Tom Meyvis & Nicolas Davidenko, Instructional manipulation checks:
Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power, 45 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 867-872
(2009). In our experiment, we asked “According to the story, to what extent did Sara Davidson realize that her
dogs were not well behaved?” and asked respondents to choose one of two options: “Sara was NOT really
aware of this” or “Sara was aware of this.”
91
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presents and special outings. Sara spends much of her free time volunteering for various local
charities. She tries to maintain a healthy lifestyle by eating well and exercising. She has many close
friends and an active social life.
[Bad Character] Sara Davidson is a 39 year old woman who lives in a house with her two dogs.
Sara has two young nieces but she rarely sees them, and does not really like to spend time with
them. She spends much of her free time watching trash-tv talk shows while smoking and eating
junk food, even though she is aware that it’s not good for her blood sugar problem. She doesn’t
socialize much and prefers to keep to herself.
Sara’s dogs are not well behaved [and she is/ but she is not really] aware of this. They are in a
fenced yard, but they sometimes escape and roam the neighborhood. On one occasion the dogs
escaped and cornered two children, barking and growling. The children were unable to escape until
a neighbor ran outside with a baseball bat and chased the dogs away. Even when fenced in the
yard, the dogs growl and act aggressively toward people walking on the sidewalk.
One morning while Sara was asleep, her dogs escaped and terrorized a neighbor who had just
opened his garage door to leave for work. They circled the man’s truck and the man jumped in the
truck to escape. His wife heard the yelling and chased them off by startling them with the noise of
the automatic garage door.
A few minutes later, two brothers, Chris and Travis, aged 8 and 11, were waiting at a school bus
stop when they saw the dogs coming at them. They panicked and climbed up a tree; the dogs
circled the tree, barking wildly. The dogs eventually headed down a ravine, and Chris climbed down
to check and see where they were. The dogs circled back toward him and chased him. Just as the
school bus approached, the dogs caught Chris and began mauling him, within view of the bus
driver and the children. The driver called 911 but it was too late – Chris died from his injuries within
minutes.

After reading the vignette, participants were asked to provide their own personal
opinion about Sara Davidson and her role in the death of the child. Specifically, participants
were asked: To what extent is Sara Davidson responsible for the death of the boy; How
negatively should Sara Davidson be judged for the death of the boy; How much blame goes
to Sara Davidson for the death of the boy; To what extent did Sara Davidson cause the death
of the boy; How intentional was Sara Davidson toward the death of the boy; From the
perspective of someone in Sara Davidson's position, how foreseeable was the death of the
boy. Questions were presented in random order, and were measured on a scale ranging from
1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
To check whether we successfully manipulated perceived moral character, we asked
to what extent Sara Davidson has a good moral character (1: not at all; 7: very much), is
trustworthy (1: not at all; 7: very much), and is a bad or good person (1: bad person; 4: not
sure; 7: good person). The order of questions was varied randomly.
3. Results92
Responses to the three variables just described, which were used to check whether we
successfully manipulated Sara Davidson’s perceived moral character, were all highly
correlated, so we combined these three items to form a single measure of Moral Character
(1:not at all; 7:very much).93 As expected, Sara Davidson’s moral character depended on
whether she was described as sociable, generous, and healthy (in the good character
92
93

ANOVA was used for analyses, unless otherwise noted.
Cronbach’s alpha = .92.
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condition) or nonsociable and unhealthy on the other (in the bad character condition).94 This
provides evidence that we successfully manipulated perceived moral character.95
In this study, we manipulated moral character, as well as awareness of the risk of
harm. We first examined the effect of moral character and of awareness on judgments of the
extent to which Sara Davidson is responsible for the boy’s death, is worthy of negative
judgment for the boy’s death, and is blameworthy for the boy’s death. These responses were
highly correlated, so we combined them into a single measure of Overall Responsibility.96
The means are illustrated in Figure 7. Sara Davidson was perceived as having more Overall
Responsibility for the boy’s death if her character was bad than if it was good;97 and possibly
if she was aware than if unaware.98 As is apparent from Figure 7, Unaware Sara is treated as
if she was aware of the risk if her moral character is bad, but is assigned noticeably less
overall responsibility if her moral character is good.

Aware

Unaware
Overall Responsibility
Good Sara

Bad Sara

F(1, 181) =
152.01, p < .001, ηp2 =.458; Mean (Good Character) = 4.40; Mean (Bad Character) =
2.61.
95
Note that we manipulated moral character, in part, by manipulating the food and exercise choices of the target
person (Sara). There is some empirical evidence that eating specific types of foods (i.e., healthy v. unhealthy)
gives rise to moral judgments about the eater. See, e.g., Richard I. Stein & Carol J. Nemeroff, Moral Overtones
of Food: Judgments of Others Based on What They Eat, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990).
Our manipulation check results (i.e., that Sara was seen as less moral based partly on food choices and exercise,
is consistent with this evidence. See also, Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, Broken Scales:
Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 1777 n. 467 (“…don’t run off and file a lawsuit if you are
fat…. Look in the mirror because you’re the one to blame” (quoting Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner,
regarding the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act)).
96
Cronbach’s alpha = .92.
97
F(1, 181) = 10.77; p < .01; ηp2 =.040.
98
This difference was only marginally statistically significant. F(1, 181) = 4.32; p = .08; ηp2 =.016. The
interaction between moral character and awareness of risk was not statistically significant. F(1, 181) < 1.
94
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Figure 7. Mean ratings of Sara Davidson’s overall responsibility in the death of the boy, by
moral character and awareness (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 3)
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Judgments of causation varied according to Sara Davidson’s awareness of risk,99 and
possibly also by moral character,100 as illustrated in Figure 8. Awareness of risk played a
clear role in judgments of causation; in addition, the Unaware Sara Davidson was perceived
to have a lessened causal role if her moral character was good.

Aware

Unaware
Causation
Good Sara

Bad Sara

Figure 8. Extent to which Sara Davidson was perceived to have caused the boy’s death
(1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 3).
Participants were asked about the extent to which the boy’s death was intentional, and
was foreseeable. Sara Davidson’s role in the boy’s death was perceived as more intentional if
Sara’s character was bad,101 and if she was aware of the risk.102 These main effects were
qualified by an interaction,103 illustrated in Figure 9. Sara Davidson with both bad character
and awareness of risk was perceived as having acted intentionally, whereas lack of awareness
or good character did not give rise to an inference of intentionality in the death of the boy.
Finally, perceived foreseeability of the boy’s death varied, not surprisingly, by whether Sara
Davidson was aware of the risk.104 There was no observed effect of moral character on
perceptions of foreseeability, and no interaction between moral character and foreseeability.
F(1, 181) = 6.83; p < .01; ηp2 =.036.
This difference was only marginally statistically significant. F(1, 181) = 2.94; p = .08; ηp2 =.016. The
interaction between moral character and awareness of risk was not statistically significant. F(1, 181) < 1.
101
F(1, 181) = 19.74; p < .001; ηp2 =.091.
102
F(1, 181) = 16.75; p < .001; ηp2 =.077.
103
F(1, 181) = 3.99; p < .05; ηp2 =.018.
104
F(1, 181) = 34.70; p < .001; ηp2 =.162.
99

100
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Aware

Unaware
Acted Intentionally
Good Sara

Bad Sara

Figure 9. Extent to which Sara Davidson was perceived to have acted intentionally toward
the boy’s death (1=not at all; 7=very much) (Experiment 3).
4. Discussion
In this third experiment, we attempted to more cleanly separate motive from character. In
Experiment 1, the chemicals for manufacturing methamphetamine signaled Frank Brady’s
bad moral character, but the chemicals also were his reason for creating the hazardous
situation that started the fire and led to the pilots’ deaths. In Experiment 2, Sam Norton’s
motive for storing the flammable oxygen signaled his moral character (bad, neutral, or good),
but it was also the reason that created the hazardous situation that led to the explosion and the
death. In Experiment 3, Sara Davidson’s traits of generosity, sociability, and even physical
fitness, signaled her moral character. The hazardous situation she created was separate from
the moral character signal. Thus, unlike in the first two experiments, Sara’s motive for
creating the hazardous situation was independent from the earlier source for inferring moral
character. Under these facts, the criminal law would permit an inference of liability based on
the hazardous situation Sara created, but not based on her personality or lifestyle. Yet,
participants viewed the boy’s death differently, depending on whether Sara was the type of
person who ignores her nieces, sits alone watching trash tv and eating junk food on the one
hand, or who spoils her nieces, volunteers, exercises, and watches her diet, on the other.
Compared to “good” Sara, “bad” Sara was perceived not only as more responsible overall for
the boy’s death. In accordance with criminal law theory, being aware of the risk that the dogs
posed to people led to greater inferences about responsibility. Interestingly, the effects of bad
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character are comparable to the effects of awareness: in this way, having a bad character is
akin to being reckless to the extent that bad character gives rise to inferences about blame
and responsibility, as well as causation. The intentionality data suggest that bad character
motivates unfavorable inferences regarding mental state. Here, failure to safeguard unruly
dogs was perceived as an intent to kill when the dog owner was not only aware of the risk but
also a bad person.
In this set of experiments, we have demonstrated empirically that perceptions of
moral character sometimes influence judgments of blameworthiness. Aside from empirically
demonstrating that moral character can in fact influence blame judgments, this set of studies
makes several other contributions to the literature on blame and character. First, we replicate
and extend Mark Alicke’s culpable control model105 – we demonstrated that negative blame
judgments arise not only because of bad reasons for acting (Experiments 1 and 2), but also
because of bad moral character that is signaled independently from reasons for acting
(Experiment 3). Alicke argued that bad reasons for acting lead to greater perceptions of
control and more extreme judgments about blame.106 Extending this model, we show
additionally that bad character (apart from reasons for acting) influences control inferences
(such as causation, intent, and foreseeability) and blame judgments. We suggest that this
tendency is rooted in more general theories about motivated reasoning. Specifically, people
are generally motivated to inculpate a defendant who they see as “bad” and this initial
motivation leads them to interpret the defendant’s transgression in a way that makes it more
legally blameworthy. Our results are consistent with the notion that bad moral character
prompts inference to a desired conclusion, namely, increased blame. Judgments about greater
causal influence and intent are also increased to justify the blame conclusion, which is likely
to follow quickly and intuitively from the information about the severity of the harm and the
moral character of the actor.
To further explore the phenomenon of motivated inculpation, in the following section
we discuss its implications for legal doctrine, with a specific focus on criminal law.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL DOCTRINE
The results of our experiments have implications that branch into two different
strands. One is that an actor’s motive (along with its implicit suggestions about moral
character) can strongly influence inferences about causation, intent, and blame. The second is
that moral character, inferred independently from motive for creating harm (or the conditions
that led to harm) can influence judgments about causation, intent, and blame. Our findings
are most consequential in legal situations when character or motive information is most
likely to enter the process. In this Article, we have concentrated on criminal cases, but
character and motive can potentially sway judgments in any kind of case. For example, an
employer being sued for discrimination might introduce evidence that the employee has a
history of cocaine use, either to provide a non-discriminatory reason for firing or simply to
try to undercut the employee’s claim for emotional distress damages. Our experiments focus
on blame attributions for acts that the law treats as criminal, and so we focus our discussion
of implications on criminal law and related issues in evidence. We specifically examine the

105
106

Alicke, supra note 29.
Id.
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implications of our finding for felony murder, evidentiary issues in sexual assault, criminal
statutory interpretation, and causation.
A. Motive and Felony Murder
In the first two experiments reported, bad motive was associated with more severe
judgments of blame and responsibility, compared to good motive. These findings mapping
intuitive notions of blame correspond well with modern definitions of mens rea. The general
hierarchy of mens rea107 corresponds to strongly held intuitions. The criminal law categorizes
intentional killings, for example, as more serious than reckless killings, which are in turn
more serious than negligent killings. Likewise, outside of a legal context we are more
inclined psychologically to blame (or inclined to blame more harshly) when a transgressor
acted intentionally, as opposed to recklessly or negligently.108 This hierarchy is so deeply
ingrained that even young children invoke it to mitigate their own responsibility for harm.109
Historical conceptions of mens rea required finding an evil purpose in order to
impose liability – terms like “vicious will,” “wickedness,” and “malevolence” were common
occurrences in judicial opinions. One prominent manifestation of this idea is traditional
felony murder doctrine, in which unforeseen deaths are treated as murder. The basis for this
treatment is the malice that is implicit in the underlying felony. The implication underlying
the doctrine is that in committing the felony, the defendant acted with an evil mind or evil
purpose, so that in doing a bad act the felon has no standing to complain about being
punished for the harmful consequences. This historical conception of mens rea as malice or
bad motive is consistent with the results from the first two experiments, showing that bad
motive is sufficient, in some circumstances, to justify blame for the harmful consequence,
even if that consequence is unanticipated.
Accordingly, public support for the felony murder rule may stem from the intuition
that anyone committing a felony is by definition acting with an evil motive, which in itself
justifies liability for ensuing harm, even an unforeseen death. By contrast, an innocent person
involved in an innocent activity that leads to a death is usually deemed as simply being
involved in an accident. But that accident becomes criminally blameworthy when the person
involved is engaged in a morally blameworthy activity.110 Felony murder, therefore, is
designed to protect society from people acting for bad reasons – those who are engaging in
dangerous felonies that demonstrate a willingness to harm others. A defendant who can
demonstrate that he was really acting for good reasons, but got caught up in producing a
dangerous situation is much less likely to be found blameworthy.

107

i.e., purposely (intentionally), knowingly, recklessly, negligently. These are referred to as “culpability
levels,” in Model Penal Code terminology.
108
Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and Legal Liability: An Empirical Study, 64
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (2001); John M. Darley et al., Doing Wrong Without Creating Harm, 7 J. EMP.
LEGAL STUD. 30 (2010). Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, Why Do We Punish?
Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment,83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002).
109
E.g., “But I didn’t mean to!”
110
See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces that Shape Our
Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (1994).
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Conversely, absence of evil motive often motivates recognition of various defenses in
criminal law.111 Most notably, duress is based on the notion that punishment is unjustly
imposed on those who acted out of fear for themselves or their loved ones, rather than
because of any evil motivation. Similarly, self-defense is permitted as a defense to liability
when a defendant can show that he harmed another to avoid harm to himself, rather than for a
reason reflecting an evil motive.
B. Moral Character and Implicit Mental State Requirements
Aspects of motive commonly come into play as necessary to understand a defendant’s
mental state, especially where mental state requirements use normatively-valenced
descriptors like “vicious will,” “wickedness,” and “malevolence.” But, although these terms
might indicate an implicit requirement of bad motive, they might also indicate an implicit
judgment of bad moral character.112 Historically, certain crimes involved acts that were
viewed as so inherently wrongful that mens rea was essentially self proving, because any
person who would do such an act was assumed to have acted with a bad intent. Thus, for
example, if I intentionally shoot a gun at someone and they are killed by my bullet, my
malicious intent is implicit in my decision to shoot at them. I cannot make a viable claim that
it was my intent only to injure them, so that their death was only negligent.
There is reason to think that the U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly held onto this
distinction. In cases where the defendant might plausibly offer a version of events where he
was a good guy who got caught up in a bad situation, the Court is more demanding of the
government and will more readily read in a specific mens rea requirement, even when it does
not appear in the statute being applied. Professor Joseph E. Kennedy has argued that this
explains the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Staples v. US, in which the Court read a
knowledge requirement into a statute criminalizing conduct that could arguably be
innocent.113 On the other hand, when the crime involves an inherently wrongful actus reus
(e.g., robbery) the Court is hesitant to impose a mental state requirement when it does not
explicitly appear in the statute.114 “In this sense, only those of good character need apply for
relief under Staples.”115
C. Moral Character in Evidence
Our experiments also have particularly potent practical implications for the treatment
of character evidence in criminal trials. Our findings highlight the highly influential potential
See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past
and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 641-667.
112
511 U.S. 60 (1994). The criminal action at question in this case was for the possession of a weapon capable
of automatically firing. The defendant Staples did not dispute his possession of the weapon, but rather claimed
that he was unaware of the weapon’s ability to fire automatically. For a discussion of the role of character in
this case, see Joseph E. Kennedy, The Story of Staples v. United States and the Innocent Machine Gun Owner:
The Good, the Bad, and the Dangerous (April 26, 2010). UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1596222.
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596222; SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, HOW CRIMINAL LAW WORKS: A
CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL GUIDE 84 (2009). (“The language was that of character judgment, and courts
assumed that in judging the criminal conduct they were making character assessments as well.”)
113
See Kennedy, supra.
114
Id. at 35-36
115
Id.
111
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of evidence of bad character, even when it is only tangentially related to the crime at hand.
Our results provide further substantiation of the concerns expressed by the judges that first
crafted and applied the common law ban on character evidence.116 These findings are also
consistent with other empirical work suggesting that the likelihood of conviction increases if
prior crimes are admitted into evidence.117
Restrictions on character evidence are primarily targeted at evidence meant to prove
the defendant’s probability of conforming to a bad moral character. 118 However, several
exceptions to this general rule exist. For example, Congress and several states allow evidence
of any past sexual transgressions to be admitted in cases involving child molestation and
sexual assault.119 A few states allow the presentation of propensity evidence in cases
involving domestic abuse.120 Also, if a defendant chooses to participate as a witness, the
Federal Rules of Evidence allow the prosecutor to present character evidence in the form of
“[o]pinion and reputation evidence” that impugns the credibility of the witnesses.121 And, as
discussed above, some character evidence can be introduced as motive in order to prove
mens rea. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly classify evidence relating to
motive as “non-character,”122 juries are likely to extrapolate information about character from
evidence about a person’s priorities, choices, and motivations.123 Thus, “what we regulate as
‘character evidence’ is only a small part of the evidence and arguments that lawyers use to
develop competing versions of the characters… in the events that are subject to litigation.”124
Despite procedural efforts to control the influence of character evidence in criminal trials,
therefore, the competing narratives that prosecutors and defense attorneys use in criminal
See, e.g., State v. Lepage, 57 N.H. 245, 289 (1876) (“[T]he very fact that a man is charged with a crime is
sufficient to create in many minds a belief that he is guilty. It is quite inconsistent with that fairness of trial to
which every man is entitled, that the jury should be prejudiced against him by any evidence except what relates
to the issue; above all should not be permitted to blacken his character….”).
117
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior
Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1357, 1380–
85 (2009) (finding a significant association between the jury’s learning of a criminal record and conviction in
cases with weak evidence).
118
See Normal Krivosha, Thomas Lansworth & Pennie Pirsch, Relevancy: The Necessary Element in Using
Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 NEB. L. REV. 657, 664 (1981) (tracing the roots
of the common law ban on character evidence to the 1810 case of Rex v. Cole); FED. R. EVID. 413-14
(“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion….”). See also Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact
Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 989 (1938); KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §186,
at 311 (6th e.d. 2006); Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” Versus “What was Done”: When to Admit Character
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV. 939, 941 (2001).
119
FED. R. EVID. 413-415. See also Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L.127, 159 (1993).
120
See Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36 IND. L. REV.
687, 700-02, n. 44 (2003).
121
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
122
FED. R. EVID. 409(b).
123
See, e.g., Peter Tillers, What is Wrong with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 810, 825
(suggesting that a connection exists between motive and character insofar as “[h]uman creatures have an
internal system of rules, principles, or operations that regulates or organizes their behavior.… [and] it is
logically permissible to suppose that ‘character’ is ‘caused’ by matters such as ‘choice’ and ‘decision’); Roger
C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 754-55.
124
Samuel R. Gross, Make-Believe: The Rules Excluding Evidence of Character and Liability Insurance, 49
HASTINGS L. J. 843, 845-46 (1998).
116
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cases are largely concerned with conveying a distinct impression of the character of the
parties involved in the case.125 Thus, characterizations about the moral character of the
parties continue to enter trials in various ways.126
D. Moral Character and Proximate Cause
One distinctive feature of the vignettes tested in these experiments is they all involved
a force that intervened between the actors’ initial action and the harm. For Frank Brady, a
negligent pilot flew in the wrong direction; for Sam Norton, a youth tossed a burning
cigarette butt onto dry leaves; for Sara Davidson, her dogs attacked the boy. These types of
situations raise the issue of proximate cause, a doctrine that helps sort those causes that are
blameworthy from those that are too remote.127 As a doctrine, proximate cause is notorious
for its lack of specific standards to guide outcomes; instead, the analysis is based heavily on
fairness considerations. Yet, a cursory look at familiar criminal law proximate cause cases is
revealing when viewed through the lens of moral character and motive, rather than more
traditional notions of remoteness and foreseeability. For example, in a case where the
defendants robbed the victim and left him passed out drunk on the side of a dark rural
highway, the court found that the robbers proximately caused the victim’s death after he was
run over by a passing car.128 In another case, the defendant led police on a dangerous 48-mile
high speed chase, resulting in the death of a police helicopter pilot; the appellate court upheld
the finding of proximate cause.129 But where the defendant had participated in a drag race
where both cars crashed through a guardrail, leading to the death of the other participant, the
appellate court reversed the conviction on proximate cause grounds.130 Arguably, these
results fit within the pattern found in the experiments: the worse the moral character of the
defendant, the more likely we are to hold him liable. Admittedly, this is an extremely small,
non-randomly selected sample of proximate cause cases. Note, however, that causation was
one of the attributes rated by the participants in the experiments: in both experiments, bad
moral character led to higher ratings of causation. Thus, it may be that proximate cause
judgments follow on the heels of intuitive judgments about blame.
IV. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
In these experimental studies, we demonstrated that a transgressor’s motive for acting
can influence judgments of blame, responsibility, causation, and intention. We also showed
that perceptions of a transgressor’s moral character can influence judgments of blame,
responsibility, causation, and intention. We certainly do not claim, however, that motive and
See Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 738 (1997) (characterizing trials as
competitions between stories, where “[p]laintiff and defendant in a trial each tell a story… and the jury chooses
the story that it likes better”); Jim M. Perdue, Winning with Stories, 69 TEX. B.J. 894, 990 (2006) (arguing that
“[a] trial story is all about character.”); Kenworthey Bilz, We Don't Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature and
the Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 429.
126
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moral character always exert influence on blame related judgments. The influence of motive
and moral character is subject to limitations, and we have not yet explored the contours of
these boundary conditions. One likely limitation on the relationship between motive and
moral character on the one hand, and blame related judgments on the other, is intentionality.
Note that the harm in each of the three experiments reported here was caused unintentionally:
Frank Brady stored flammable chemicals which led to the unintentional death of a firefighter;
Sam Norton stored oxygen which led to the unintentional death of the youth; Sara Davidson
kept unruly and dangerous dogs which led to the death of a child that she in no way intended.
These narrow circumstances of recklessly or negligently caused deaths contain features that
tip the blaming process toward consideration of motive and moral character. We will discuss
a few of them here.
First, when the harm of a transgression is severe, as is the case when a victim dies,
our drive to blame kicks into high gear.131 More severe harm results not only in more severe
judgments of punishment, but also a greater likelihood of finding that the actor is responsible
for the consequences of their harmful action.132 For example, when people read a story about
a bank robber whose bullet misses the teller but ricochets and hits a customer, they are likely
to judge the robber as more responsible, more reckless, and his action more causal, when the
injury is severe as opposed to mild.133 A harm-based version of retributivism can explain
why punishment should increase with severity of harm. That liability judgments should
become more likely with severity of harm is more puzzling, but nonetheless consonant with
the notion that we generally treat more severe harm more harshly.134 Thus, in our three
experiments, perceivers were highly motivated to blame, and as a result, were especially
motivated to search for information that could justify this impulse. Bad motive and bad
character might have fit this need.
Second, none of the trangressors in our experiments acted intentionally in causing
harm. When mental state is ambiguous, it can be difficult to gauge the blameworthiness of
the actor. When a wrongdoer kills another person intentionally, we know to assign a great
deal of blame, and the wrongdoer’s moral character would likely have minimal influence on
blame perceptions. Note here that we are discussing judgments of blame and responsibility,
rather than punishment judgments.135 A cold-blooded killer who is perceived as having a
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good character might receive less punishment than if his character is perceived as bad; but
judgments of responsibility and blame for the killing might not reflect any difference in
moral character.136
Turning from moral character to motive, the picture likely changes, at least to some
degree. The influence of motive on blame judgments could perhaps still emerge in the
context of intentionally causing death. A person who kills another out of greed (e.g., for
inheritance money) might be perceived as more blameworthy than one who is driven by
mercy (e.g., killing a terminally ill and suffering loved one). This will be an important
question to explore in future work, and for now we are limited to mere speculation. Outside
of this extreme example, however, it may be that the influence of motive on blame judgments
is greatly attenuated when the transgressor acts intentionally, because the intentional mental
state overwhelms other influences like motive and moral character.
Our analysis of boundary conditions is speculative, but is supported by findings in the
context of the influence of propensity evidence (such as prior crimes) on jury verdicts. Recall
that Eisenberg & Hans found that juries who learned of a defendant’s prior criminal record
were more likely to convict, but only when the overall evidence was relatively weak. Thus,
the weight of other factors can easily overwhelm the influence of similar prior acts, and by
extension, perhaps also the influence of moral character and motive on guilt judgments and
blame judgments.
The twin notions of guilt and blame give rise, perhaps surprisingly, to an important
distinction. The propensity studies discussed in the beginning of this Article suggest that
learning about a criminal defendant’s prior crimes can increase the likelihood of a guilty
verdict in the current case. These findings are subject to certain limitations. For example, if
the prior crime is very dissimilar, or is not serious, the influence of the propensity
information on verdict diminishes or disappears. Likewise, the influence of propensity
information on initial individual juror preferences can dissipate when jurors deliberate and
reach a group verdict.137 Taken as a whole, the focus of this body of research is different, and
also more specific, than our aim in the experiments we discuss in this Article. Whereas the
propensity studies focus on the influence of prior crimes, our focus is on the influence of two
constructs that are broader in scope: moral character and motive. It may well be the case that
prior crimes serve as a proxy for moral character information, so that prior crimes is simply a
subset of the set of information that gives rise to inferences about moral character. It might
alternatively be the case that the influence of prior crimes also works through a slightly
different mechanism that draws more on processes of analogical reasoning than does the
influence of moral character. Recall that the seriousness of prior crime is not the only
dimension along which the influence of prior crimes varies; similarity of prior crime might
well be an influence that operates independently of seriousness. Although the seriousness of
prior crime could logically be interpreted as a proxy for moral character, this is unlikely to be
the case with regard to crime similarity, as an independent dimension.
The important point in this Article is that the focus of the experiments reported here is
quite different than the focus of the earlier research on prior crimes as propensity evidence.
In addition, the objects of influence are different in our research as well. The earlier
propensity evidence studies focused almost exclusively on judgments of guilt – either in the
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form of individual mock juror judgments, or verdicts of mock juries. In the current
experiments, by contrast, we are interested not specifically in guilt judgments or punishment,
but rather in basic psychological processes of blame and responsibility. These basic
processes play a key role in verdicts, to be sure. But their importance goes beyond modeling
jury behavior. Intuitive judgments of blame and responsibility are made very quickly, and
probably automatically, as the perceiver first processes the story about the transgression.138
Our initial inclinations about whether to categorize the person that we are judging as “good”
or “bad” can motivate us to blame or exculpate them. This initial motivation, in turn, can
influence our interpretation of the person’s actions in a way that allows us to excuse their
responsibility or find them blameworthy for the harm they caused. These quick, initial,
intuitive blame judgments are also likely to play a key role in how potential litigants perceive
a harm-relevant event, how parties approach dispute resolution processes, and outside of the
legal system, how ordinary people interact when faced with a perceived wrong. But, as
demonstrated by our studies in this Article, motivated inculpation can also enter into the
criminal context, where law has tried -- through the imposition of formalized processes -- to
separate liability from character-based inferences. Even here, when all other aspects of the
harm caused by an action and the situation in which it occurred are held constant, the actor’s
perceived moral character or bad reasons for acting can color the way that we determine
discrete components of criminal liability like knowledge, mental state, and forseeability.
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